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I'.l C'Hf SLPPE'·l': COUKT 
C'I' Tlf2 STr1.TE OF UTAH 
anrt Respondent, 
Case No. 18987 
J;,"f «I:HARD NEbTO!l, 
Defendant and 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to 
evidence which he alleged was seized in violation of his 
rHJc<ts under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the 
Constitution and Article I, Sections 12 and 14 of 
chu Constitution of Utah. 
DISPOSITIO'.l IN T'-IE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information in the Third 
Jud1ci3l District Court with forgery, a felony of the second 
.:c··Lc»0 , and theft, a of the third degree. 
On January 14, 1983, the appellant's motion to suppress 
:1e alleged was seized in violation of his constitutional 
1 1 •;c1s heard before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third 
The motion was subsequently denied. 
The appellant then waived his c1nht 
tried before the Honnra'Jl_, L-11'-
January 24, 1983. 
not guilty of the theft 
l.n-1 
L J • I l 
day to the statutory t:erm of cne tc fifteen ;-e<'trs in the state 
prison. 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the denial of h1s 
suppression motion and consequently a reversal his convict1nn. 
The charges should then be or a new trial granted. 
STATEMEtTT OF F_!\CTS 
On January 20, 1982, one James Alfred Clark, store 
manager for Reams Bargain Annex, was presented with a ch12c:< 
for $397.43 drawn on an account entitled Peck and Peck (R-44) 
He cashed the check (R-45) for the individual who gave it to him, 
writing down the individual's social security and driver's 
license number on the check ( R-4 6) . He did not identify the 
defendant as the person who gave him the chec'' (R-47). 
had not in fact been drawn or authorized by Peck and Peck 
nor had the person to whom the check had been made out ever 
seen it (R-56). 
The man to whom the check had been made out, on12 Fre2r, 
had earlier misplaced his driver's license (R-53). He also 
stated that while he had a social security number he had no 
social security card (T-61, 62). Nevertheless, a social securi t'-' 
card with his number and a driver's license with his licer,sc 
-2-
1red a:; idce:1tification for the check 
'
1 i'. 3, 3tzite'sexhibit 1). 
On J', .,··ucir-/ 18, 1982, a Dennis Holm of Adult Probation 
,:; ; :i.rolc: ·,;on'. t.c• the premise3 of a Debbie and Leon Smith to 
i,1vesti Ji1t2 ,, sho0'.ing (R-64, 67-68). Smith was on parole from 
the ctule prison r-65) The Smith's were the exclusive 
occ 1Jt=iants of the pre!l'ises (R-69). Mrs. Smith then gave Holm a 
fold 12r one thick full of papers (R-70). The folder 
contai:1ed driver's licenses with the pictures cut out, social 
securitJ cards, business cards, and several blank checks (R-67, 78). 
o.rnony the ;:oapers •,;as Frear's lost lice!1se (R-66). Possession 
these items was a violation of Smith's parole (R-72). 
On January 19, 1982, a month before the Smith search, 
the appellant was arrested by a George Sinclair (R-79) . The 
arrest was for a charge not related to the ;:oresent case as the 
warra:1t was issued in December, 1981 (R-80). Newton had in his 
pccsession a bank account card with the name Frear on it (R-75) 
He did not have either the license or the social security card 
i;, ?rear's narr.e 1,·!:ic'1 were shown as identi::'ication in Reams the 
day. Newton has been incarcerated from January 19th 
to tC.1e pre3er.t tine (R-80, R-130). 
Cn April 14, 1982, a Sandy City police officer named 
'ihert was advised by Sinclair of Newton's irrest in 
and also that Frear's license with Newton's picture 
c on it had been found in the search of Srni th 1 s home in 
b1·uar (P-100). (Note- at one point Nortz testified this had 
but h,e later corrected his mistake (R-123, R-101) 
'lo•t7 ,Jc,·ided to interview }!ewton at the jail (R-95) 
-3-
The appellant moved to suppress the re.0 ul t.-; c)F the intervic'..i 
and during the trial (R-22, R-92, R-138-1421. 
(R-29). 
],, __ ' '- motion '·''·3'.:> d·_:_-n: 
Nortz did in fact contact Newton in the jail (R-12S,. 
He told Newton he was investigating a forged check and would 11"; 
talk to him about it. He first advised him of his so-called 
rights (R-126). He had no search warrant (R-128), didn't as:, if 
Newton was represented by an attorney (R-125), didn't ask if he r.a.j 
an attorney (R-125), and no attorney was present during the i'1ter-.· 1 
(R-102). However, Newton had been represented by counsel at his 
request since his arrest on the other charges in January, 1982 
(R-130, 131). 
Nortz showed Newton two checks, one marked "Leon 
the parolee, and the other was the Lee Peck check ( R-12 6) . llewton 
denied any knowledge of either check and Nortz then asked him to 
out a handwriting s?ecimen sheet, telling him first only that he 
didn't have to do it if he didn't want to, (R-127-128). Newton 
filled the sheet out (R-129). The sheet was then sent to a 
handwriting expert at Weber State University (R-129). 
The expert testified that the author of the handwriting 
sample and the endorsement on the rear of the Lee Peck check -.-1as 
the same person (R-106). The Court then found the appellant 
of forgery and not guilty of theft (R-116). 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED 
HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
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actions of the police deprived the appellant of 
,-,,ch,1:cs the most riqht in the criminal justice system, 
to counsel. The investigating officer, acting on a 
': 1 n '1'J"= amounting tc tirobable cause, went without a search warrant 
to tl1e where the appellant had been held for three months 
en another charge. His intention was to gather evidence. The 
of a warrant would seem to violate the precepts of the 
F'ourth '\mendment and Article I, Section 14 of the federal and 
state constitutions. Once there, the officer made no inquiry 
as to whether the appellant had counsel although he was aware 
of the pe11ding charges and the length of time the appellant 
had been jailed. He took a handwriting sample from the appellant 
which proved to be the sole link at trial between the appellant 
and the alleged forgery. This, too, would seem to violate a 
constitutional guarantee, the state Article I, Section 12 right 
not to give evidence against oneself, Hansen v. Owens, 619 P.2d 
315 (Utah 1980). To these claimed constitutional violations the 
State will be heard to say that the appellant was given a 
Miranda warning and thus he voluntarily waived his rights. Such 
an argument cannot be sustained because even a Miranda warning 
will not overcome the fact that all of the officer's actions 
occurred in the absence of the appellant's counsel. It is the 
denLal of this most fundamental right which mandates a 
suupression of the handwriting exemplar and thus a reversal of 
t convict ion. 
It is permissible to interrogate an accused who has 
l'1•rn':·crl his right to silence, his Fifth Amendment right, about 
-5-
other, unrelated crimes he m3y have colT1s;-:ittcd once he ha.s 3gain 
been given the Miranda •.varninq, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975). It is significant here tl1cit "at no time in the 
questioning did Mosely indicate a desire to consult a 
lawyer . ." 423 U.S. 96, 97. ;.. more recent case, Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), demonstrates the greater p::-otectio;· 
afforded to one who invokes his right to counsel, his Sixth 
Amendment right. 
In Edwards, the accused was charged with three serious 
felonies. The arresting officers proposed a plea bargain and 
he responded, "I want an attorney before making a deal", 451 U.S. 
477, 479. Questioning ceased. The following day, Edwards was 
again given his Miranda rights and questioned about the crime. 
This time he confessed, 451 U.S. 477, 479. The Court observed, 
"waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary, but must also 
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege, a matter which depends 
in each case'upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and 
conduct of the accused' [citations omitted]," 451 U.S. 477, 483. 
The Court concluded, . that when an accused has invoked his 
right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a 
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing 
only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial 
interrogation even if he has been advised of his (€mphasi 0 
added). We further hold that an accused, such as Edwaros, havinq 
-6-
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
,-_,uns-cl nas been made available to him, unless the accused 
t'1mself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conver-
sations with the police, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485. Edward's 
confession was suppressed and his conviction reversed. 
The impact of Edwards on the present case is starkly 
apparent. The appellant here had not only invoked his right to 
counsel, he had secured representation. He may have given the 
handwriting sample atter receiving a Miranda warning but Edwards 
expressly held that the mere giving of such a warning would not 
constitute the waiver of counsel by one who had invoked that 
right. The police here, as in Edwards, were constitutionally 
bound to deal with the appellant through his attorney and their 
failure to observe that right requires that the handwriting 
sample acquired in the absence of counsel be suppressed. 
It is of no significance that the officer here 
interrogated the appellant about an offense unrelated to the 
one for which counsel had been requested and secured because 
Edwards creates no such exception to its rule. To repeat, 
Edwards says that an accused, "having expressed a desire to deal 
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him," unless he himself initiates the contact, 
451 U.S. 477, 484-485. Edwards does not permit interrogation of 
one who asks for or who has counsel on some subjects but not 
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others, it flatly prohibits any in the 
of counsel. 
The antecedents of of the 
decision lie in a group of cases decided in New York under the 
state constitutional right to counsel, precisely the same as the 
Utah provision. The first of these cases was People v. Poaers, 
48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709 (1979). Rogers was arrested 
for robbery, an attorney entered the case, and interrogation on 
the robbery ceased. However, several hours later, after the 
accused purportedly ·.vaived his rights, interrogation commenced 
on some unrelated activities to which the accused confessed, 
397 N.E. 2d 709, 711. The Court declared, . that or.ce 
a defendant is represented by an attorney, the police may not 
elicit from him any statements, except those necessary for 
processing or his physical needs. Nor may they seek a waiver 
of this right, except in the presence of counsel," 397 N.E. 2d 70Q, 
713. The Court's rationale for its conclusion is illuminating, 
"An attorney is charged with protecting the rights of his client 
and it would be to ignore reality to deny the role of counsel 
when the particular episode of questioning does not concern the 
pending charge. It cannot te assumed that an attorney would 
abandon his client merely because the police represent that they 
seek to question on a matter unrelated to the charge on which 
the attorney has been retained or assigned. Finally, it is the 
role of defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine 
whether a particular matter will or will not touch upcn the 
-8-
charge. Once a defendant has an attorney as advocate of 
h1° >l'J".ts, the att•Jc!lt"/'s function cannot be negated by the simple 
of in his absence. 
The presence of counsel confers no undue advantage to 
accused. Rather, the attorney's presence serves to 
'''.;ualiz9 the position's of the accused and sovereign, mitigating 
the coercive influence of the State and rendering it less 
overwhelming. That the rule diminishes the likelihood of a waiver 
of self incriminating statements is to our system of 
Justice, [citati•:ms omitted]. Although the State has a 
interest in investigating and prosecuting criminal 
conduct, that interest cannot override the fundamental right to 
an attorney guaranteed by our State Constitution. Available are 
means other than subjecting a person represented by an attorney 
interrogation in the absence of counsel," 397 N.E. 2d 709, 713. 
Rogers has been followed in People v. Ferrara, 54 N.Y. 2d 498, 
no '.LE. 2d 1275 (1981); People v. Coulter, 84 A.D. 669, 446 NYS 
2d 618 (1981); and People v. Moore, 448 NYS 2d 213 (1982). 
The reasoning of Edwards and Rogers ought to be 
compelling here if the right to counsel is not to be diluted in 
the state of Utah. The appellant was a captive audience for the 
interrogation, having been in jail for three months. He had an 
attorne;. The attorney should not have to concern himself over 
wnetner the police are visiting his client without his knowledge 
0r consent. It would be ludicrous to conclude that if 
1n•errogation is permitted, unknown to the attorney, on "unrelated" 
the interrogators will scrupulously avoid the charge on 
-9-
which representation has been 
counsel must not be underestimated. 
the defendant, an unsophisticated h2ve immediate] 
been informed that the handwriting samr:ile could not Lie .:lcquired 
without a warrant and in any event he could refuse to give it 
pursuant to Hansen v. Owens. A:o the Court obsep;ed in !'agers, 
it is the presence of any attorney which serves to equalize the 
power of the state and the accused. If the state is permitted 
this Court to circumvent the attorney then that precarious oalance 
will tip overwhelmingly in favor of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
The handwriting sample taken in the absence of counsel 
must be suppressed and the conviction reversed. 
DATED this day of 11 r___..-__ __ , 19 8 3 • 
EDWARD K. BR..i\SS 
Attorney for Appellant 
321 South Sixth East 
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